We'd like to raise awareness about the rsync security release version 3.4.0-1 as described in our advisory ASA-202501-1.
An attacker only requires anonymous read access to a vulnerable rsync server, such as a public mirror, to execute arbitrary code on the machine the server is running on.
Additionally, attackers can take control of an affected server and read/write arbitrary files of any connected client.
Sensitive data can be extracted, such as OpenPGP and SSH keys, and malicious code can be executed by overwriting files such as ~/.bashrc or ~/.popt.
We highly advise anyone who runs an rsync daemon or client prior to version 3.4.0-1 to upgrade and reboot their systems immediately.
As Arch Linux mirrors are mostly synchronized using rsync, we highly advise any mirror administrator to act immediately, even though the hosted package files themselves are cryptographically signed.
All infrastructure servers and mirrors maintained by Arch Linux have already been updated.
Follow the procedure described in FS32#365 .
Arch Linux hasn't had a license for any package sources (such as PKGBUILD files) in the past, which is potentially problematic. Providing a license will preempt that uncertainty.
In RFC 40 we agreed to change all package sources to be licensed under the very liberal 0BSD license. This change will not limit what you can do with package sources. Check out the RFC for more on the rationale and prior discussion.
Before we make this change, we will provide contributors with a way to voice any objections they might have. Starting on 2024-11-19, over the course of a week, contributors will receive a single notification email listing all their contributions.
- If you receive an email and agree to this change, there is no action required from your side.
- If you do not agree, please reply to the email and we'll find a solution together.
If you contributed to Arch Linux packages before but didn't receive an email, please contact us at package-sources-licensing@archlinux.org.
With the release of version 7.0.0 pacman has added support for
downloading packages as a separate user with dropped privileges.
For users with local repos however this might imply that the download
user does not have access to the files in question, which can be fixed
by assigning the files and folder to the alpm group and ensuring the
executable bit (+x) is set on the folders in question.
$ chown :alpm -R /path/to/local/repo
Remember to merge the .pacnew files to apply the new default.
Pacman also introduced a change to improve checksum stability for
git repos that utilize .gitattributes files. This might require a
one-time checksum change for PKGBUILDs that use git sources.
